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IN THE UTAH COURT OP APPEALS 
THE STATE OP UTAH I 
Plaintiff-Respondent, i 
v. t Case No. 880371-CA 
t Priority No. 2 
LEON EARL DENNEY, t 
Defendant-Appellant, t 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from an order of the Fifth District 
Court of Iron County, State of Utah, denying defendant's Motion 
to Terminate Probation Nunc Pro Tunc and revoking defendant's 
probation and committing him to the Utah State Prison for two 
concurrent terms of sero to five years for two third degree 
felony offenses of Uttering a Forged Prescription. As the 
underlying crimes were third degree felonies, jurisdiction lies 
in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. $ 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1987). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Whether defendant's appeal should be dismissed for 
failure of his brief to comply with the procedural requirements 
for perfection of an appeal as set forth in Rule 24(a)(7) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals. 
2. Whether the trial court was correct in sentencing 
defendant to two consecutive eighteen month terms of probation, 
notwithstanding Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (1982)(Supp. 1988). 
3. Whether defendant, by requesting a probationary 
term of three years in lieu of a prison sentence, waived his 
right to a possible earlier statutory probation termination, 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(7)(a) (1982)(Supp. 1988), 
and/or whether defendant should now be estopped from alleging as 
error that which he himself requested of the court. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
For purposes of this brief, respondent relies on: 
1) Rule 24(a)(7),(9) of the Rules of the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 
2) Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1 (1982)(Supp. 1988), 
3) Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (1978)(Supp. 1988), and 
4) Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401 (1978) 
The full text of these provisions are attached in the Addenda. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
On September 18, 1985, defendant, Leon Earl Denney, 
pled guilty to two third degree felony offenses of Uttering a 
Forged Prescription in the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron 
County, State of Utah, the Honorable Robert F. Owens, Associated 
District Judge, sitting by appointment, presiding. Defendant was 
sentenced by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Associated District 
Judge, sitting by appointment, on March 20, 1986 to two 
concurrent terms of zero to five years at the Utah State 
Penitentiary. At defendant's request, the execution of his 
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prison term was suspended or stayed and he was placed on 
probation for a period of three years (two consecutive 18-month 
terms). 
On May 17, 1988, following an Order to Show Cause 
Hearing wherein defendant was found to be in violation of his 
probation agreement, his probation was revoked and the original 
sentence imposed. This is an appeal from the order revoking the 
defendant's probation and sentencing him to two concurrent terms 
of zero to five years in the Utah State Penitentiary for two 
counts of Uttering a Forged Prescription. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On March 20, 1986, after pleading guilty to two counts 
of Uttering a Forged Prescription, defendant was sentenced to 
serve two concurrent terms of zero to five years at the Utah 
State Penitentiary by the Honorable J. Philip Eves, sitting as 
District Judge by assignment (Transcript of the Sentencing 
Hearing held March 19, 1986 [hereinafter T.3/19/86] at 41.) 
After a lengthy hearing at which defendant and his counsel argued 
strenuously against commitment to prison, Judge Eves suspended or 
stayed the execution of the prison term. At the express request 
of defendant through his counsel (See Defense Counsel's 
Recommendation, R. at 26, attached in the Addenda), defendant was 
placed on an extended term of three-years probation under the 
intensive supervision of Adult Probation and Parole (T.3/19/86 at 
41). The three year term of probation was a combination of two 
eighteen-month probationary terms upon conviction of two third 
degree felony offenses, running consecutively (Transcript of 
-*-
Hearing on Motion to Terminate Probation held May 17, 1988 
[hereinafter T.5/17/88} at 6.) The granting of probation was 
contingent upon defendant's compliance with the terms of his 
probation agreement, which defendant indicated that he understood 
(T.3/19/86 at 41-43). On April 12 1988, during defendant's 
continuing probation, Judge Eves issued an Order to Show Cause, 
ordering defendant to appear and show why his probation should 
not be revoked on the allegations that defendant had been 
arrested for Driving Under the Influence in the State of Nevada, 
and that defendant had committed credit card fraud (See copy of 
the allegations of the Order to Show Cause, R. at 62-65, 
attached in the Addenda). On May 17, 1988, defendant's probation 
was revoked and the original concurrent sentences of zero to five 
years were imposed, upon a finding by the court that defendant 
had consumed alcohol and was driving under the influence, 
(Transcript of the Order to Show Cause Hearing held May 17, 1988 
[hereinafter T. OSC 5/17/88] at 7), and had knowingly furnished 
false information to obtain a credit card; each of which was in 
violation of the specific terms of defendant's probation 
agreement (T. OSC 5/17/88 at 37). Defendant has since been 
convicted and sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the credit 
card fraud. That conviction is currently on appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
DEFENDANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR 
FAILURE OF HIS BRIEF TO COMPLY WITH THE 
PROCEDURAL REQUIREMENTS FOR PERFECTING AN 
APPEAL AS SET FORTH IN RULE 24(a)(7) OF 
THE RULES OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS. 
Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals 
provides in part# "[t]he brief of the appellant shall contain 
under appropriate headings and in the order here indicated . . . 
(7) . . . All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record 
(See Paragraph (3)).H (emphasis added) The language of the Rule 
is clear and unambiguous. It's purpose, if only in part, is to 
verify and/or clarify the information found in the brief and to 
forestall the court and respondent having to examine and search 
the entire record for the specific reference cited by defendant. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in Fackrell v. Fackrell, 740 
P.2d 1318 (Utah 1987), speaking of Rule 24(a)(7) of the Rules of 
the Utah Supreme Court which is identical to Rule 24(a)(7) of the 
Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals, stated "If counsel on appeal 
does not provide adequate citations to the record, the judgment 
of the lower court is presumed to be correct.- Id. at 1319. 
[citing Trees v. Lewis, 738 P.2d 612, (Utah 1987); and State v. 
Tucker, 657 P,2d 755, 756 (Utah 1982).] 
Defendant's short Statement of Facts makes no specific 
citations to the record but in lieu thereof states, "[r]ather 
than making citations to the record on appeal, this writer is 
attaching the pertinent orders of the trial court as the addendum 
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of this brief." (Brief of Appellant at 4). The statute does not 
provide for an alternative. Further, defendant's Argument is 
also bare of the references required under Rule 24(a)(9). The 
procedural requirements as set forth under the Rules of the Utah 
Court of Appeal8 in order to perfect an appeal have not been 
sufficiently complied with; therefore the judgment of the lower 
court should be presumed to be correct and this appeal dismissed. 
POINT II 
THE LOWER COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION 
BY SENTENCING DEFENDANT TO TWO CONSECUTIVE 
TERMS OF PROBATION. 
Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(7)(a)(1982)(Supp. 1988) 
provides: 
Upon completion without violation of 18 
month's probation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B 
misdemeanor cases, the probation period shall 
be terminated, unless earlier terminated by 
the court. 
There is no dispute that under this section a 
probationary term of more than eighteen months, for a single 
felony conviction, would in most cases be considered an abuse of 
discretion. There is provision in Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1(7)(c) 
for an extension of probation in certain circumstances upon 
notice and hearing or waiver of notice and hearing by defendant. 
Nonetheless, contrary to the assertion of defendant, neither this 
section, nor the recent case of State v. Green, 757 P.2d 462 
(Utah 1988), dispose of the present issue. The issue here is 
whether the trial court can sentence an individual to two 
consecutive terms of probation when each term is comprised of the 
18-month statutory period. If the court can impose such 
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consecutive terms of probation, then defendant's probation was 
properly revoked during the second, consecutive, term of his 
probation. 
Though an order of consecutive sentences of probation 
is unusual, it can be read consistently with state law and public 
policy. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (1978)(Supp. 1988) provides 
that the Court may sentence a person Mto any one of the following 
sentences or combination of them: (a) to pay a fine; (b) to 
removal from or disqualification of public or private office; (c) 
to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; (d) 
to imprisonment or; (e) to death." (emphasis added) A sentence 
can run either concurrently or consecutively. See Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-401 (1978); See also State v. Snyder, 747 P.2d 417 (Utah 
1987) ("It lies within the discretion of the trial court to 
impose sentences or a combination of sentences which may include 
payment of a fine, restitution, probation, or imprisonment." Ld. 
at 420); State v. Shelby, 726 P.2d 987 (Utah 1986). The 
foregoing statutes, when read together, appear to allow 
consecutive terms of probation. Further, the Utah Supreme Court 
in State v. Garcia, 504 P.2d 1015 (Utah 1972) stated: 
...the trial court in a criminal prosecution 
is granted wide discretion in dealing with 
the defendant after he is convicted, and the 
statutes grant to the trial court wide powers 
other than pronouncing the sentence provided 
by law. The court may in its discretion 
place a defendant on probation on whatever 
conditions it deems proper. 
Id. at 1016. The Utah Supreme Court has indicated that the 
purpose of allowing probation is to "provide an opportunity for 
reformation." State v. Bonza, 150 P.2d 970, 972 (Utah 1944); See 
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also State v. Zolantakisf 259 P. 1044 (Utah 1927). Since the 
time required for reformation differs from individual to 
individual, depending on such circumstances as the criminal 
conduct, past behavior and so forth, consecutive sentences of 
probation for multiple crimes is, in certain circumstances, 
consistent with and necessary to achieve the underlying purpose 
of probation of allowing sufficient time for reformation. 
The States which have addressed this question have 
placed limits on consecutive sentences of probation. The reasons 
for such limits were not the same for all the states, but for 
several different reasons which are not necessarily applicable to 
this state's policy. The reasons given by those courts which 
have limited consecutive sentences of probation can be separated 
for the most part into three distinct groups. First, some of the 
states have adopted a statutory probation limit of five years, 
and believe that rehabilitation will occur, if ever, within that 
time. The Iowa Supreme Court in State v. Angle, 353 N.W.2d 421, 
425 (Iowa 1984), held that the trial court had erred in ordering 
two consecutive five-year periods of probation. Iowa state law 
provided that the length of probation would be for a term fixed 
by the trial court but could not exceed five years for a felony 
offense. The defendant had argued that the Iowa legislature had 
not indicated•that the maximum length of probation should be 
extended as a result of the length of possible incarceration. 
That state's Supreme Court accepted the defendant's theory 
although it said that the issue was not free from doubt. They 
held that the statute limiting the total probationary term to 
- f t . 
five years was consistent with the belief of correctional 
authorities that "rehabilitation will occur within five years or 
not at all. See J. Yeager 6 R. Carlson, Criminal Law and 
Procedure S 1731, at 377-78 (1979).M Id at 425. Apparently, in 
Iowa the trial court could have imposed consecutive probationary 
terms for separate offenses but only if the total probationary 
time did not exceed the five year maximum. 
In State v. Gonzales, 608 P.2d 23 (Alaska 1980), the 
defendant challenged the legality of his sentence in which he was 
given consecutive probationary terms which totaled ten years. 
The Alaska statute provided that probationary periods in that 
state, including extensions, could not exceed five years. Again, 
apparently consecutive terms could be imposed but only if the 
total amount of time on probation did not exceed five years. 
The Maryland Court of Appeals in State v. Oliver, 490 
A.2d 242, (Md. Ct. App. 1985), cited Maryland law which is that 
confinement can be ordered with the remainder of the sentence 
suspended and the defendant placed on probation. The 
probationary period can be for a period longer than the sentence 
but not in excess of five years. The Court of Appeals held that 
the trial court could not grant probation for a period to run 
consecutively to any other period of probation if the total of 
the probationary periods exceeded five years. Evidently, a grant 
of consecutive probationary periods would be acceptable if the 
total term did not exceed five years. In 1985, when this opinion 
was written, federal law, the law of fifteen states and the 
Virgin Islands contained a similar five-year limitation on 
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probationary periods. Two states allowed probation to be set at 
the discretion of the judge, two limited the probationary period 
to the maximum term authorized for the crime and two expressly 
required concurrent probationary periods. See Id. at 252. 
The second category of reason for limiting consecutive 
probationary periods is that there was no longer a statutory 
provision which would allow a trial court to "stack" probationary 
periods. In State v. Gereaux, 338 N.W.2d 118 (Wis. Ct. App. 
1983), the Wisconsin Court of Appeals remanded the case to the 
trial court with directions that the probation on defendant's 
second count must run concurrently with the first count. The 
1965 version of Wisconsin's statute regarding probation had 
expressly provided that periods of probation could be imposed 
consecutively. The law had been revised prior to the Gereaux 
case and reference to consecutive probationary periods had been 
omitted. In that factual setting, the appellate court held that 
the trial court erred in imposing consecutive probationary 
periods. The fact that the earlier statute had made express 
reference to consecutive probation but that the language had then 
been omitted by the legislature when revising the statute led the 
court to conclude that consecutive probationary periods were no 
longer permitted in Wisconsin. 
Finally, in some states there exists a specific 
statutory directive forbidding use of consecutive probationary 
periods. In People v. Tedford, 445 N.E.2d 841, (111. Ct. App. 
1983), the Second District Appellate Court of Illinois held that 
the trial court erred in sentencing defendant to consecutive 
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periods of probation. Illinois law mandated that multiple terms 
of probation imposed at the same time must run concurrently based 
on the language of the statute. 
Utah law does not expressly provide for nor forbid the 
use of consecutive probationary periods as do some other states. 
As stated above, Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201 (1978)(Supp. 1988) 
allows a court to sentence a defendant to probation. Section 76-
3-401 (1978)(Supp. 1988) mandates that, if a defendant has pled 
guilty to more than one felony offense, the court shall determine 
whether the sentences will be imposed concurrently or 
consecutively. Provision for the termination or the extension of 
probationary periods are contained in Utah Code Ann. S 77-18-1 
(1982)(Supp. 1988). Subsection (7)(a) says that a felony 
probation will terminate at the conclusion of eighteen months if 
there are no violations of the probationary conditions. 
Subsection (7)(c) provides that, at any time prior to the 
termination of the probation, upon notice and hearing or upon 
waiver of the notice and hearing by the probationer, the court 
has the option to extend probation for an additional 18-month 
term if fines or restitution are still owing. Subsection (9)(a) 
provides that probation may be modified or extended upon waiver 
of a hearing by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding 
in court that the probationer has violated the conditions of 
probation. The respondent maintains, as contained in Point III 
A, that defendant has waived his right to a hearing as 
contemplated in Subsection (9)(a). 
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The reasons advanced by the state courts which have 
previously addressed this issue, though valid, appear not 
specifically applicable to the statutes and policy of this State. 
Though Utah law does not specifically forbid nor expressly 
provide for the use of consecutive probationary periods, such use 
may be implied by the statutory provisions that the term 
NsentenceN includes probation and that a sentence can be imposed 
either concurrently or consecutively. Further, unlike those 
states which have adopted a five-year (60-month) maximum 
probationary period, in this state the language of the statute 
allows for an automatic termination at the end of eighteen months 
if the court does not modify or extend the period under the 
provisions of Subsections (7) or (9). The Utah statute does not 
have any language which specifically limits a total probationary 
period to a specific term as do the other states, which expressly 
limit the period to no more than five years. For the most part, 
it has been held in those states adopting the five-year limit 
that rehabilitation will occur within five years or not at all. 
Based on that theory of rehabilitation, those states have limited 
the time during which a defendant can show that he has been 
rehabilitated. If during the five years of probation the 
individual has not shown that he or she can conform his or her 
behavior to the law, probation can be revoked and incarceration 
imposed. If, on the other hand, the individual can now conform 
to the law, probation can appropriately be terminated. Though 
rehabilitation/reformation is similarly the goal of this state, 
the Utah legislature has not as directly addressed the theory 
•12-
that rehabilitation will occur within five years. The fact that 
the legislature has allowed for automatic termination of 
probation after eighteen months, barring a modification or 
extension as provided for in the statute, does not necessarily 
mean that the legislature felt that rehabilitation would be 
completed within that period. The legislature did not specify a 
maximum time beyond which a probationary period could not be 
extended as did other state legislatures. The fact that the 
legislature provided for a means to extend a probationary term 
and did not set an express limit beyond which a term could not be 
extended argues that consecutive probationary terms do not 
violate the legislative intent behind the probation. 
The legislature has spoken on a limit imposed on the 
courts when imprisonment is involved. Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-
401(4) (1978) mandates that consecutive sentences cannot order an 
aggregate minimum sentence of more than twelve years' 
imprisonment and an aggregate maximum sentence of more than 
thirty years' imprisonment, unless the crime authorizes a death 
penalty or life imprisonment. However, this does not address the 
probationary time limits. 
Defendant was placed on probation on March 20, 1986, 
for a period of three years (R. at 40-46). In view of his prior 
record and the circumstances involved in the case, the trial 
court was strongly considering a commitment to the Utah State 
Penitentiary (T.3/19/86 at 39). In an effort to avoid such 
confinement, defendant requested an extended term of three-years 
probation (See Defense Counsel's Recommendations in the Addenda, 
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R. at 26 and T.3/19/86 at 21). The intent was that the 18-month 
term of probation for each third degree felony conviction would 
run consecutively, thus resulting in a three-year term of 
probation (T.5/17/88 at 6-7). The imposition of the consecutive 
sentences was justified once the court considered the gravity and 
circumstances of the offense and the history, character and 
rehabilitative needs of defendant, even though the offenses may 
have been addressed at the same arraignment. See Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-3-401(2) (1978). The three year probation did not exceed 
the original sentence of imprisonment of zero to five years on 
each count, or the maximum period of probation of eighteen months 
per felony conviction, nor did the probationary sentence exceed 
the consecutive sentence limitation provided under Utah Code Ann. 
S 76-3-401(4) (1978). 
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401(1) (1978) provides, in part, 
that M. . . sentences shall run concurrently unless the court 
states, in the sentence, that they shall run consecutively." The 
state concedes that in the sentencing hearing in the present case 
there is no express reference by the court for the implementation 
of consecutive sentences. Nonetheless, defendant expressly 
requested the three-year term of probation, which the trial court 
later said was intended to be two consecutive 18-month terms (R. 
at 26). The purpose of S 76-3-401(1) is to avoid ambiguity in 
the sentence. Here the consecutive probation sentence totaling 
three years was requested by defendant and evidence thereof is 
present in the record. Therefore the requirement of § 76-3-
-14-
401(1) should be deemed satisfied or in the alternative should be 
deemed waived, due to the express request by defendant. 
For the foregoing reasons, respondent maintains that 
consecutive sentences of probation are consistent with and valid 
under state law. Therefore the trial court did not abuse its 
discretion by revoking defendant's probation upon sufficient 
evidence of a violation thereof, and reinstating the original 
sentence pursuant to the court's authority under Utah Code Ann. § 
77-18-1(9)(c) (1982)(Supp. 1988). The trial court's decision 
terminating defendant's probation should be affirmed. 
POINT III 
DEFENDANT BY EXPRESSLY REQUESTING A THREE 
YEAR TERM OF PROBATION IN LIEU OF A PRISON 
SENTENCE WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO A POSSIBLE 
EARLIER STATUTORY TERMINATION OF PROBATION 
PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANN- S 77-18-1(7)(a) 
(1982)(Supp. 1988), AND/OR IS ESTOPPED FROM 
ALLEGING AS ERROR THAT WHICH HE SPECIFICALLY 
REQUESTED OF THE COURT. 
A. Waiver 
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known 
right. See Hunter v. Hunter, 669 P. 2d 430 (Utah 1983). Waiver 
has been found to have been made either expressly or by 
implication at many different stages of a criminal proceeding. 
See State v. Tuttle, 399 P.2d 580 (Utah 1965) (defendant's 
presentation of evidence to the jury, coupled with no prior 
motion to suppress, constituted waiver of alleged illegal search 
and seizure of evidence); State v. Kelsey, 532 P.2d 1001 (Utah 
1975) (Waiver of right to trial by jury may be made in a capital 
case); State v. Beck, 584 P.2d 870 (Utah 1978) (Upon plea of 
guilty defendant waived any claim of error by policeman, in 
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application for arrest warrant, that defendant had been 
identified as murderer); State v. Sydallf 433 P. 2d 10 (Utah 1967) 
(Waiver of right to preliminary examination). As a general 
proposition, rights granted by statute or by the state or federal 
Constitution may be waived. See 28 Am.Jur.2d § 163 (1966)(Supp. 
1988); See also Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24 (1965); and 
Palmer v. Broadbent, 260 P.2d 581 (Utah 1953) (person for whose 
benefit statutory provision was enacted may waive provision if 
rights of others are not affected) 
There is evidence in the record that, at the time of 
defendants'8 sentencing, he, by and through his attorney, 
expressly requested a three-year term of probation in lieu of a 
prison sentence (R. at 26). The court accepted the probationary 
term of three years as the combined two eighteen-month terms for 
each third degree felony conviction to be served consecutively 
(T.3/17/88 at 6). By requesting and stipulating to the three-
year term, defendant either expressly or impliedly waived any 
right of probation termination under S 77-18-1(7)(a) after 
eighteen months of violation-free probation. 
Defendant cites in his brief the Utah Supreme Court 
decision of State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987) 
contending (at least it appears) that defense counsel's request 
for a three-year probation on behalf of defendant was not a 
sufficient waiver to bind defendant. This is simply un-
persuasive. The Gibbons case involved the requirement that the 
trial court assure itself and make a record that defendant fully 
understood the rights he was relinquishing when he entered a 
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guilty plea. In that case the record was silent as to whether 
the defendant understood the elements of the crimes to which he 
was pleading guilty. In the present case it is clear on the 
record that defendant knew that the trial judge was strongly 
leaning toward sending him to prison for the offenses to which he 
pled guilty (T.3/19/86 at 39). The sentencing record is replete 
with instances where defendant presented arguments which were 
obviously intended to persuade the court to allow him probation 
rather than to incarcerate him (T.3/19/86 at 17-20, 25-34). 
Granted, the recommendation found at page 26 of the Record is 
entitled "Defense Counsel's Recommendations", but defendant 
obviously agreed to the recommendation if it would keep him from 
being sent to prison. At the conclusion of the lengthy 
sentencing hearing, the trial court, on the record, placed 
defendant on probation for a period of three years under the 
provisions of the intensive supervision program by the Department 
of Adult Probation and Parole (T.3/19/86 at 41). After 
enumerating the conditions of probation the court addressed 
defendant asking if he had any questions or misunderstood any of 
the provisions of the sentence. To that, defendant answered no 
(T.3/19/86 at 43). At no time did defendant object to the 
imposition of a three-year probation. Respondent maintains that 
by answering the court as defendant did, he waived his right to 
notice and hearing for purposes of modifying or extending 
probation under S 77-18-1(7)(c) or (9)(a). Defendant's request 
to the Court constituted an express or implied waiver of his 
right to automatic termination of probation after eighteen 
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months. Defendant stated that he understood the requirements for 
his probation. Whether this waiver came directly through him or 
through his attorney does not or should not affect the validity 
of the waiver. Defendant had the right to waive this statutory 
right and it was very beneficial to do so in light of the 
impending prison sentence. Therefore the court did not abuse its 
discretion in sentencing defendant to three-years probation nor 
in revoking that probation even after the first eighteen months 
had passed. 
B. Estoppel 
The Utah Supreme has held in State v. Aikers# 51 P.2d 
1052 (Utah 1935), that ". . .a party cannot assign as error a 
ruling which he has himself induced the court to make." JId. at 
1058. If, in fact, the court was in error in sentencing 
defendant to three-years probation upon his conviction for two 
third degree felonies, defendant is estopped from assigning as 
error that ruling, for it was he himself who requested and 
induced the court to make the ruling (R. at 26). 
At the time that defendant was placed on probation for 
a period of three years, the court, in view of defendant's prior 
record and circumstances involved in the case was strongly 
considering a commitment to the Utah State Prison. In an effort 
to avoid such a commitment, defendant requested, inter alia, an 
extended term of probation. The intent was that the 18-month 
term of probation for each third degree felony conviction would 
run consecutively, rather than concurrently, thus resulting in a 
three year term of probation. 
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In Webster v. Jones# 587 P.2d 528 (Utah 1978), a 
plaintiff who had been convicted of drunk driving and placed on 
probation filed a habeas corpus proceeding to restrain a city 
court from revoking his probation after he was arrested for 
burglary. He claimed that the original conviction was defective 
because the city judge had found that he was not indigent and the 
judge would not appoint counsel for him. The Utah Supreme Court 
held with regard to estoppel, 
. . . we think it should be discordant to any 
one's sense of fairness and justice, as it is 
our own, for a person to accept a judgment 
which places him on probation during good 
behavior, enjoy the benefits thereof until 
his misconduct justifies revocation of the 
probation, then attempt to revert back and 
attack the judgment. The principle of 
estoppel is not usually spoken of as applying 
in the criminal law, but the principle of 
fairness and good conscience pervades 
throughout the law, and this plaintiff, 
having enjoyed the benefit of the judgment so 
long as it favored him, should not in good 
conscience be allowed to turn about and 
complain thereof. 
Id. at 530-531. The situation in Webster and the situation in 
the present case are very much alike. As in Webster, defendant 
here received the benefit of being placed on probation, later 
violated that probation, and now seeks to attack the original 
term of probation after being found in violation of that 
probation. As indicated by the Supreme Court, a defendant should 
not be allowed in the name of fairness and justice to accept 
probation during good behavior, enjoy the benefits thereof, 
commit misconduct calling for a revocation of probation, then 
attack the previous ruling placing him on probation. 
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As the Court in Webster indicated, estoppel is not 
usually spoken of as applying in the criminal law, nonetheless, 
the principle has been used many times in the courts of this 
state during criminal proceedings. See State v. Knill, 656 P.2d 
1026 (Utah 1982) (Defendant waived preliminary hearing then asked 
for remand for a hearing to be held; on appeal he was estopped 
from objecting to the timeliness of the hearing); State v. Danks, 
418 P.2d 488 (Utah 1966) (Defendant discharged retained and 
appointed counsel; he was precluded on appeal from complaining 
about lack of counsel); State v, Neal, 262 P.2d 756 (Utah 1953) 
(Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal and then a Motion for a 
Rehearing of Motion for a New Trial; the Motion was heard and 
denied. Defendant was precluded on appeal from claiming as error 
that the trial court lacked jurisdiction after the Notice of 
Appeal was filed). 
In the present case defendant should be estopped from 
requesting the trial court to act in a certain way because it is 
beneficial to him, and then later, after he himself causes the 
benefits of the court's action to cease, attacking that same 
action. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, respondent asks this Court to 
affirm the revocation of defendant's probation. 
•4 DATED this \f day of January, 1989. 
R. PAUL VAN DAM 
Attorney General 
•^ mgvs.s 
CHARLENE BARLOW 
Assistant Attorney General 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
RuleS4 MftJB OF THB UTAH OOUKT OP APPEALS 
Rule 14. Briefs. 
(a) Brief of appellant The brief of the appellant shall contain under ap* 
propriate headings and in the order here indicated: 
(1) A complete list of all parties to the proceeding in the court or 
agency whose judgment or order is sought to be reviewed, except what 
the caption of the case on appeal contains the names of all such parti* 
The list should be set out on a separate page which appears immediately 
inside the oover. 
(2) A table of contents with page references. 
(3) A table of authorities with cases alphabetically arranged and with 
parallel citations, agency rules, court rules, statutes, and other authori-
ties cited, with references to the pages of the brief where they are cited. 
(4) A brief statement showing the jurisdiction of this court and describ-
ing the nature of the proceedings below. 
(5) A statement of the issues presented for review. 
(6) Constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regula-
tions whose interpretation is determinative, set out verbatim with the 
appropriate citation. If a pertinent part of a quotation is lengthy, the 
citation alone will suffice, and in that event, the provision shall be act 
forth as provided in Paragraph (f) of this rule. 
(7) A statement of the case. The statement shall first indicate briefly 
the nature of the case, the course of proceedings, and its disposition in the 
court below. There shall follow a statement of the facts relevant to the 
issues presented for review. All statements of fact and references to the 
proceedings below shall be supported by citations to the record (see Para-
graph (3)). 
(8) A summary of arguments. The summary of arguments, suitably 
paragraphed, shall be a succinct condensation of the arguments actually 
made in the body of the brief. It shall not be a mere repetition of the 
heading under which the argument is arranged. 
(9) An argument The argument shall contain the contentions of the 
appellant with respect to the issues presented and the reasons therefor, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied 
on. 
(10) A short conclusion stating the precise relief sought. 
(b) Brief of respondent The brief of the respondent shall conform to the 
requirements of Paragraph (a) of this rule, except that a statement of the 
issues or of the case need not be made unless the respondent is dissatisfied 
with the statement of the appellant. 
.(c) Reply brief. I t o appellant may file a brief in reply to the brief of the 
respondent, and if the respondent has cross-appealed, the respondent may file 
a brief in reply to the response of the appellant to the issues presented by the 
cross-appeal. Reply briefs shall be limited to answering any new matter set 
fcrth in the opposing brief. No further briefs may be filed except with leave of 
eourt 
(d) References In briefs to parties. Counsel will be expected in their 
briefs and oral arguments to keep to a minimum references to parties by such 
designations as "appellant- and "respondent* R promotes clarity to use the 
designations used in the district court, jurenfle court, or circuit court or in the 
THE JUDGMENT 
Section Section 
77-1S-1. Suspension of sentence — Probe- 77-1S-3. Disposition of fines. 
tion — Supervision — Preeen- 77-18-6.5. Judgment of desth — Defendant 
tence investigation — Confi- lo select method — Time of se~ 
dentist — Terms —> Restitution lection. 
— Extension or revocation — 77-18-6 Judgment to pay line or leatitu-
Hearings. lion constitutes a lien. 
77-18-2. Expungement and seeling of 
records. 
77-18-1. Suspension of sentence — Probation — Supervi-
sion — Presentence investigation — Confidential 
— Terms — Restitution — Extension or revoca-
tion — Hearings. 
(1) (a) On a plea of guilty or no contest or conviction of any crime or of-
fense, the court may suspend the imposition or execution of sentence end 
place the defendant on probation. Supervised probation by the depart-
ment may not be imposed by the court in cases of class C misdemeanors or 
infractions. The jurisdiction of all probationers referred to the Depart-
ment of Corrections is vested in the court having jurisdiction; custody is 
with the Department of Corrections. 
(b) The legal custody of all probationers not referred to the department 
is vested as ordered by the court having jurisdiction of the defendant. The 
court has continuing jurisdiction over all probationers. 
(2) (a) The Department of Corrections shall establish supervision and pre-
sentence investigation standards for all individuals referred to the de-
partment. These standards shall be based on the type of offense, the 
demand for services, the availability of agency resources, and other crite-
ria established by the Department of Corrections to determine what level 
of services shall be provided. 
(b) Proposed supervision and investigation standards shall be submit-
ted to the Judicial Council and Board of Pardons for review and comment 
prior to adoption by the Department of Corrections. 
(3) Notwithstanding other provisions of law, the Department of Corrections 
is not required to supervise the probation of persons convicted of class B or C 
misdemeanors or infractions, or to conduct presentence investigation reports 
on class C misdemeanors or infractions. However, the department may super-
vise the probation of class B misdemeanants in accordance with department 
standards. 
(4) Prior to the imposition of any sentence, the court may, with the concur-
rence of the defendant, continue the date for the imposition of sentence for a 
reasonable period of time for the purpose of obtaining a presentence investiga-
tion report from the Department of Corrections or information from other 
sources about the defendant. The presentence investigation report shall in-
clude a specific statement of pecuniary damages, accompanied by a recom-
mendation from the Department of Corrections regarding the payment of 
restitution by the defendant. The contents of the report are confidential and 
not available except for purposes of sentencing as provided by rule of the 
Judicial Council and for use by the Department of Corrections. At the time of 
sentence, the court shall hear any testimony or information the defendant or 
the prosecuting attorney desires to present concerning the appropriate sen-
tence. This testimony or information shall be presented in open court on 
record and in the presence of the defendant. 
(5) While on probation, and as a condition of probation, the defendant may 
be required to perform any or all of the following. 
(a) pay, in one or several sums, any fine imposed at the time of being 
placed on probation; 
(b) pay amounts required under Chapter 32a, Title 77, Defense Costs; 
(c) provide for the support of others for whose support he is legally 
liable; 
(d) participate in available treatment programs; 
(e) serve a period of time in the county jail not to exceed one year; 
tf) eerve a term of koine confinement; 
(i) make restitution or reparation to the victim or victims in accordance 
with Subsections 76-3*201 (S) and (4). 
(6) The Department of Corrections is responsible for the collection of fines 
and restitution during the probation period in cases where the court orders 
supervised probation by the department. The prosecutor shall provide notice 
of the restitution order to the clerk of the court. The clerk shall place the order 
on the civil docket and shall provide notice of the order to the parties. The 
order is considered a legal judgment under which the victim may seek civil 
remedy. 
(7) (a) Upon completion without violation of 18 months' probation in felony 
or class A misdemeanor cases, or six months in class B misdemeanor 
eases, the probation period shall be terminated, unless earlier terminated 
by the court. 
(b) The Department of Corrections shall notify the sentencing court 
and prosecuting attorney in writing 45 days in advance in all cases where 
termination of supervision will occur by law. The notification shall in-
clude a probation progress report and complete report of details on out-
standing fines and restitution orders. 
(c) At any time prior to the termination of probation, upon a minimum 
of five days' notice and a hearing or upon a waiver of the notice and 
bearing by the probationer, the court may extend probation for an addi-
tional term of 18 months in felony or class A misdemeanors or six months 
in class B misdemeanors if fines or restitution or both are owing. 
(8) (a) All time served without violation while on probation applies to ser-
vice of the total term of probation but does not eliminate the requirement 
of serving 18 consecutive months without violation in felony or class A 
misdemeanor cases, or six consecutive months without violation in class 
B misdemeanor cases. Any time served by a probationer outside of con-
finement after having been charged with a probation violation and prior 
to a hearing to revoke probation does not constitute service of time toward 
the total probation term unless the probationer is exonerated at a hearing 
to revoke the probation. Any time served in confinement awaiting a hear-
ing or decision concerning revocation of probation does not constitute 
service of time toward the total probation term unless the probationer is 
exonerated at the hearing. 
(b) When any probationer, without authority from the court or the 
Department of Corrections, absents himself from the state, or avoids or 
evades probation supervision, the period of absence, avoidance, or evasion 
tolls the probation period. 
(c) Nothing in this section precludes the court from discharging a pro-
bationer at any time, at the discretion of the court. 
(9) (a) Except as provided in Subsection (7Kc) of this chapter [section], pro-
bation may not be modified or extended except upon waiver of a hearing 
by the probationer or upon a hearing and a finding in court that the 
probationer has violated the conditions of probation. Probation may not 
be revoked except upon a hearing in court and a finding that the condi-
tions of probation have been violated. 
(b) Upon the filing of an affidavit alleging with particularity facta as-
serted to constitute violation of the conditions of probation, the court 
which authorized probation shall determine whether the affidavit estab-
lishes probable cause to believe that revocation, modification, or exten-
aion of probation is justified. If the court determines that there is probable 
cause, it shall cause to be served on the defendant a copy of the affidavit 
and an order to show cause why his probation should not be revoked, 
modified, or extended. 
(c) The order to show cause shall specify a time and place for the hear-
ing, and shall be served upon the defendant at least five days prior to the 
hearing The defendant shall show good cause for a continuance. The 
order to show cause shall inform the defendant of a right to be repre-
sented by counsel at the hearing and to have counsel appointed for him if 
he is indigent. The order shall also inform the defendant of a right to 
present evidence. 
(d) At the hearing, the defendant shall admit or deny the allegations of 
the affidavit. If the defendant denies the allegations of the affidavit, the 
prosecuting attorney shall present evidence on the allegations. The per-
aons who have given adverse information on which the allegations are 
dant unless the court for good cause otherwise orders. The defendant may 
call witnesses, appear and speak in his own behalf, and present evidence, 
(e) After hearing, the court shall make findings offset. Upon a finding 
that the defendant violated the conditions of probation, the court may 
order the probation revoked, modified, (or] continued, or that the entire 
probation term commence anew. If probation is revoked, the defendant 
shall be sentenced or the sentence previously imposed shall be executed. 
(10) Restitution imposed under this chapter is considered a debt for *willfui 
and malicious injury" for purposes of exceptions listed to discharge in bank-
ruptcy as provided in Title 11, Section 623, U.S.C.A. 1985. 
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PART 2 
SENTENCING 
Section 
76-3-201. 
7*4-201.1. 
W3-201.2. 
Sentences or combination of sen-
tences allowed — Civil penal-
ties — Restitution — Defini-
tions — Resentencing — Aggra-
vation or mitigation of crimes 
with mandatory sentences. 
Nonpayment of fine or restitution 
as contempt — Imprisonment 
— Relief where default not con-
tempt — Collection of default. 
Civil action by victim for 
Section 
76-3-202. 
764-203. 
Paroled persons — Termination 
or discharge from sentence — 
Time served on parole — Dis-
cretion of board of pardons 
Felony conviction — Indetermi-
nate term of imprisonment — 
Increase of sentence if firearm 
76-3-207. Capital felony — Sentencing pro-
76*3-201. Sentences or combination of sentences allowed 
— Civil penalties — Restitution — Definitions — 
Resentencing — Aggravation or mitigation of 
crimes with mandatory sentences. 
(1) Within the limits prescribed by this chapter, a court may sentence a 
person adjudged guilty of an offense to any one of the following sentences or 
combination of them: 
(a) to pay a fine; 
(b) to removal from or disqualification of public or private office; 
(c) to probation unless otherwise specifically provided by law; 
(d) to imprisonment; or 
(e) to death. 
(2) This chapter does not deprive a court of authority conferred by law to 
forfeit property, dissolve a corporation, suspend or cancel a license, or permit 
removal of a person from office, dte for contempt, or impose any other civil 
penalty. A civil penalty may be included in a sentence. 
(8) (a) (i) When a person is adjudged guilty of criminal activity which has 
resulted in pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it 
may impose, the court shall order that the defendant make restitu-
tion up to double the amount of pecuniary damages to the victim or 
victims of the offense of which the defendant has pleaded guilty, is 
convicted, or to the victim of any other criminal conduct admitted by 
the defendant to the sentencing court unless the court in applying the 
criteria in Subsection (8Kb) finds that restitution is inappropriate. 
Whether the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inap-
propriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision a part of 
Chapter SO, Title 77, or has been transported at governmental ex-
pense from one county to another within the state for the purpose of 
resolving pending criminal charges, and is a4judged guilty of crimi-
nal activity in the county to which he has been returned, the court 
may, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, order that the 
defendant make restitution for costs expended by any governmental 
entity for the extradition or transportation. In determining whether 
restitution is appropriate, the court shall consider the criteria in 
Subsection (8Kb). If the court determines that restitution is appropri-
ate or inappropriate, the court shall make the reasons for the decision 
a part of the court record. The court shall send a copy of its order of 
restitution to the Division of Finance, 
(b) In determining whether or not to order restitution, or restitution 
which is complete, partial, or nominal, the court shall take into account: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that 
payment of restitution will impose, with regard to the other obliga-
tions of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment 
basis or on other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of 
restitution and the method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines make restitu-
tion inappropriate, 
(c) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow him a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(4) As used in Subsection (3): 
(a) "Criminal activities" means any offense of which the defendant is 
convicted or any other criminal conduct for which the defendant admits 
responsibility to the sentencing court with or without an admission of 
committing the criminal conduct. 
(b) "Pecuniary damages" means all special damages, but not general 
damages, which a person could recover against the defendant in a civil 
action arising out of the facts or events constituting the defendant's crimi-
nal activities and includes, but is not limited to, the money equivalent of 
property taken, destroyed, broken, or otherwise harmed, and losses such 
as earnings and medical expenses. 
(c) "Restitution" means full, partial, or nominal payment for pecuniary 
damages to a victim, including insured damages. 
(d) "Victim" means any person whom the court determines has suffered 
pecuniary damages as a result of the defendant's criminal activities. "Vic-
tim" does not include any coparticipant in the defendant's criminal activi-
ties. 
(5) (a) If a statute under which the defendant was convicted mandates that 
one of three stated minimum terms shall be imposed, the court shall order 
imposition of the term of middle severity unless there are circumstances 
in aggravation or mitigation of the crime. 
(b) Prior to or at the time of sentencing, either party may submit a 
statement identifying circumstances in aggravation or mitigation, or pre-
senting additional facts. If the statement is in writing, it shall be filed 
with the court and served on the opposing party at least four days prior to 
the time set for sentencing. 
(c) In determining whether there are circumstances that justify imposi-
tion of the highest or lowest term, the court may consider the record in 
the case, the probation officer's report, other reports, including reports 
received under Section 76-3-404, statements in aggravation or mitigation 
submitted by the prosecution or the defendant, and any further evidence 
introduced at the sentencing hearing. 
(d) The court shall set forth on the record the facts supporting and 
reasons for imposing the upper or lower term. 
(e) The court in determining a just sentence shall be guided by sentenc-
ing rules regarding aggravation and mitigation promulgated by the Judi-
cial Council. 
(6) (a) If a defendant subject to Subsection (5) has been sentenced and com-
mitted to the Utah State Prison, the court may, within 120 days of the 
date of commitment on He own motion, or at any time upon the recom-
he had not previously bean sentenced, so long as the new sentence is no 
greater than the initial sentence nor less than the mandatory time pre-
scribed by statute. The resentencing provided for in this section shall 
comply with the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council to eliminate 
disparity of sentences and to promote uniformity of sentencing. Credit 
shall be given for time served. 
(b) The oourt shall state the reasons for its sentence choice on the 
record at the time of sentencing. The court shall also inform the defen-
dant as part of the sentence that if the defendant is released from prison, 
he may be on parole for a period of ten years. 
(c) If during the commission of a crime described as child kidnaping, 
rape of a child, object rape of a child, sodomy upon a child, or sexual abuse 
of a child, the defendant causes substantial bodily injury to the child, and 
if the charge is set forth in the information or indictment and admitted by 
the defendant, or found true by a judge or jury at trial, the defendant 
ahall be sentenced to the aggravated mandatory term in state prison. This 
subsection supersedes any conflicting provision of law. 
Parti 
Limitations and Special Provisions on Sentenoes 
T6-3-401. Concurrent or ooniecntive sentenoei—Limitations.—(1) Sub-
ject to the limitations of subsections (2) through (5), a court shall deter-
mine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than one felony 
offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences for the of-
fenses. Sentences shall run concurrently unless the court states, in the 
sentence, that they shsll run consecutively. 
(2) A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the of-
fenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the de-
fendant in determining whether to impose consecutive sentences. 
(8) A court may impose consecutive sentences for offenses arising out 
of a single criminal episode as defined in section 76-1-401. 
(4) If a court lawfully determined to impose consecutive sentences, 
the aggregate minimum of all sentences imposed may not exceed twelve 
years* imprisonment and the aggregate maximum of all sentences imposed 
may not exceed thirty years' imprisonment. However, this limitation does 
not apply if an offense for which defendant is sentenced authorizes the 
death penalty or life imprisonment 
(5) The limitation in subsection (4) applies: 
(a) If a defendant is sentenced at the same time for more than one 
offense; 
(b) If a defendant is sentenced at different times for one or more 
offenses, all of which were eommitted prior to imposition of sentence for 
any one or more of them; 
(e) If a defendant has already been sentenced by a court of this state 
ether than the present sentencing court or by a court of another state or 
federal jurisdiction, 
(•) In determining the effect of consecutive sentences and the manner 
in which they shall be served, the board of pardons shall treat the defend-
ant as though he has been eommitted for a single term with the following 
incidents, 
(a) The prison term shell consist of the aggregate of the validly im-
posed prison terms; and 
(b) The minimum term, if any, shsll constitute the aggregate of the 
validly imposed minimum terms* 
(7) Whenever a sentence is imposed or sentences are imposed to run 
eoncurrently with the ether or with a sentence presently being served, the 
lesser sentence shsll merge fasto the greater and the greater shall be the 
term to be served, and in the «r*nt nf #nn*1 u n t < n ^ #)**« •v.n
 MAMM i_«M 
ADDENDUM B 
DEFENSE COUNSEL'S RECOMMENDATION 
One (1) year in the Iron County Jail; 
A fine of $2,000.00 to be paid within the one year; 
A work release from the Jail, from 6:00 A.M. until 
8:00 P.M., to work and support himself and his family; 
Payment of $50.00 per month for his housing in the jail 
negating any expense to the State; 
Mr. Denney to initiate Drug Abuse treatment, at his own 
expense; and 
Mr. Denney to be under strictly supervised probation 
for a period three (3) years. 
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ADDENDUM C 
_ _ APR 201988 
O0UNT* OP IRON, STATE GP UTAH ~ . - a - .
 k Jtu 
************ llj/lJMsA^mrfrJ OBPUIY 
STATE OP UTAH JL 
Plaintiff, 
V8. 
LEON EARL DENNY 
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE 
CASE NO. 1027 
Defendant• 
************ 
Upon reading the affidavit of J Lowe Barton, Probation Officer for Adult 
Probation and Parole, of the State of Utah, asking that an Order to Show cause 
be issued as to why the above-named Defandant should not have his probation 
revoked and forthwith be committed to the Utah State Prison. 
NOW THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the Defendant, named, be 
>rdered and required to appear before the Honorable J. Philip Eves, Judge of 
he Fifth District Court at his courtroom located at 68 South 100 East, 
arowan, Utah, at the hour of 9-*cAtf on the )*$})•> day 
t/\p+)f 9 1988, then and there to show cause, if any, why the 
robation of said Defendant should not be revoked by the Court and why the 
lid Defendant should not be forthwith committed to the Utah State Prison. 
»e Defendant is specifically informed, by this Order, that he has the right 
be represented by counsel at the time of hearing; and if said Defendant 
mot afford counsel, one shall be appointed for him by the Court. Moreover, 
> Defendant is specifically informed that he has the right to present 
dence at the hearing. 
DATED THIS \ 2 . % DAY OP cud? . 1988. 
oouny OP IRON, STATE OP UTAH 
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Case No.: 1027 
State of gtah 
Plaintiff 
vs. 
Leon Denny 
Defendant 
********** 
STATE OF OTAH SS. 
J Lowe Barton, being first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and says: That he 
is a District Agent for the Adult Probation and Parole Department; that on the 
eighteenth day of September 1985 the above defendant was found guilty by jury 
(or pleaded guilty) in the above court of (or to) the crime of Ottering a 
forged prescription, a third degree felony and on March 20, 1986 was sentenced 
to the term of zero to five years in the Utah State Prison for said crime; 
Stay of execution was granted and the defendant was placed on probation 
for a period of three years commencing on March 20, 1986. Be was further 
ordered to enter into and abide by the conditions set forth in the Probation 
Agreement, a copy of which is attached. 
That the defendant did violate the terms and conditions of his probation 
as follows, to-wit: 
ALLEGATION #1: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is in violation of Condition 5 of 
the Adult Probation & Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 "I shall 
obey all local, state and federal laws and municipal 
ordinances at all times. I shall report any arrests or 
citations to the Department of Corrections within 72 hours of 
occurrence"; in that, on February 5, 1988 Mr. Denny entered a 
plea of no contest to the charge of D.U.I, in Tonopah, 
Nevada. A $650 fine was imposed. Mr. Denny was ordered to 
serve 48 hours of community serviae in Cedar City. 
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ALLEGATION #2: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is in violation of Condition 5 of 
the Adult Probation & Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 *I shall 
obey all state and federal lavs and municipal ordinances at 
all times. I shall report any arrests or citations to the 
Department of Corrections within 72 hours"; in that, on March 
28, 1988 Mr. Denny was found to be in possession of two 
financial transaction cards. One with the name Leon C. 
Denning the other with the name L.C. Denning. At the time the 
search of the residence was conducted on March 25, 1988 
receipts indicating the use of these financial transaction 
cards were found in Mr. Denny's business records. It should 
be noted that the names appearing on the financial transaction 
cards are aliases previously known to have been used by Mr. 
Denny. Possession of these cards is in violation of Utah Code 
76-6-506.1 and 76-6-506.2. 
ALLEGATION #3: It is alleged that Mr. Denny is violation Condition 5 of the 
Adult Probation & Parole Agreement, to-wit: 5 "I shall obey 
all state and federal laws and municipal ordinances at all 
times. I shall report any arrests or citations to the 
Department of Corrections within 72 hours of occurrence." in 
that, at the time Mr. Denny was cited for the D.U.I, noted 
above, he did not report the arrest to the Office of Adult 
Probation fc Parole within 72 hours of occurrence. 
Investigating the situation it was also learned that Mr. Denny 
was cited for a second D.U.I, offense in September of 1987. 
However, this was later dismissed but was never reported to 
the Office of Adult Probation & Parole in the 72 hour limit as 
specified in the Adult Probation fc Parole Agreement. 
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WHEREFORE, your affiant prays that an order of the court issue directing 
and requiring the defendant, above named, to be and appear before said Court 
to show cause, if any he has why the aforesaid period of probation should not 
be revoked, and why said defendant should not be forthwith committed to the 
Utah State Prison. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SHORN TO before me 
this /2ik~' day of Apr'6' , 1988. 
Notary residing at: Cedar city, UT 84720 
ty commission expires: Yt6 • /S, /9?0 
ipw 
)680A 
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